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The concept of a "team" generates revered images of camaraderie,
selflessness, and persistence. Yet, lurking below this positive veneer is a core of
problematic attributes. The virulence of this core is made visible by the legal
controversy surrounding the questionable legality of labor-management teams. 1
This new managerial strategy has been threatened by a rigid interpretation of
the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") by some courts and the National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB").2 To promote these allegedly beneficial
teams, proponents of the dominant trend in managerial theory-cooperative
management-assert the need for a legislative amendment to the NLRA.3
Opponents of such an amendment fear that a result of the amendment would be
the resurrection of the company-dominated union, whose abolition was one of
the primary purposes of enacting the NLRA.4 These opponents contend that the
revered characteristics of teams are noticeably absent from labor and
management teams. 5
This Note will evaluate both arguments in an attempt to reach a conclusion
about the merits of amending the NLRA. Part I of this Note will examine
cooperative management 6 plans in the United States. Part II will explore the
history of company unions. Part III will discuss the legislative response to
company unions, specifically section 8(a)(2)7 of the NLRA. Part IV will
I Most labor-management teams share the following characteristics: (1) almost equal
numbers of persons from both labor and management, (2) committees that discuss and decide
together their priorities, (3) committees chaired by persons from both labor and management
who are mutually agreed on and serve usually on a rotating basis, (4) committee meetings that
are regularly scheduled or when needed, and (5) input from all members of the committees to
ensure that a large number of both management and labor are participating in the problem
solving process. See Note, Participatory Management Under Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 1736, 1739 (1985).
2 See, e.g., William C. Byham, Congress Should Strengthen the Corporate Team, WAiL
ST. J., Feb. 5, 1996, at A14.
3 See id.; see also Gregory J. Hare, Employee Participation Programs: A Great Idea,
Bt Are They Lawfid?, 1991 DET. C.L. REV. 973, 1017.
4 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 248, at 29-40 (1995).
5 See id.
6 Labor-management teams are one form of cooperative management plans.
7 Section 8(a)(2) states that: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer.., to
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any organization or contribute
financial or other support to it...." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982) (The National Relations
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analyze the NLRB's decision in Electromation, Inc.8 and its effects on
cooperative management plans. Part V will evaluate both labor-management
teams and the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act ("T.E.A.M."), 9 a
proposed legislative amendment to the NLRA.
I. COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT PLANS
A. The Growth of Cooperative Management Plans
Cooperative management plans have become increasingly prevalent in
American businesses in the past two decades. 10 In 1982, approximately 14% of
all corporations and 33 % of all corporations with over 500 employees had some
form of cooperative management. 11 By 1994, the United States General
Accounting Office estimated that this percentage had risen to 80% of all
Fortune 500 companies. 12 In fact, "the prevailing management wisdom of the
day" views cooperative management plans as the "right" way to build modem
organizations. 13
Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982)). Section 2(5) of the NLRA defines a "labor
organization" as "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole
or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." 29 U.S.C. § 152(a)(5) (1982).
8 309 N.L.R.B. 990, enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
9 See H.R. 1529, 103d Cong. (1993).
10 See, e.g., COMMISSION ON THE FuruRE oF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS,
FACr FINDING REPORT TO U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR AND U.S. DEP'T OF COMERmCE 55 (1994)
(estimating that between one-fifth and one-third of the workforce is covered by some form of
employee participation); Christopher J. Martin, Electromation and Its Aftermath, 19
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 133-34 (1993) ("It has been estimated that there may be as many as
30,000 such committees currently in operation, involving as many as 9 million employees at
80 percent of the Fortune 1,000 companies in the United States."); Labor Statutes Did Not
Anticipate Modem Workplaces, Experts Say in Responding to Electromation Decision, 142
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 161 (Feb. 15, 1993) (citing the comments of Gerald E. Ledford, Jr.,
senior research scientist at the Center for Effective Organizations at the University of
Southern California, that a survey showed that 80% of Fortune 1,000 employers "have some
type of employee participation program.").
11 See OFFCE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, NEW YORK SToCK EXCHANGE, PEOPLE AND
PRoDucrTY: A CHALENGE TO CORPORATE AMERICA 23-24 (1982).
12 See David R. Sands, Management-Worker Programs Again Face NLRB Challenge,
WASH. Tims, Dec. 17, 1993, at Bil.
13 If all is not well in your traditionally structured, hierarchical organization, the reason
is that there are inherent, irreparable flaws in hierarchical systems that have rendered
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The increase in these plans has been justified as a necessary response to
intense competitive pressures existing in a globalized economy. 14 Many
American businesses point to studies showing a decline in productivity,
increased foreign competition, and reports of worker dissatisfaction as
motivation to experiment with cooperative management programs. 15
The basic assumption fueling the increase in these programs is that
cooperation based on mutual respect and trust is more beneficial to all parties
than confrontation between management and labor. 16 Employers allegedly
benefit by increased profits resulting from improved worker productivity17 and
the elimination of mid-level management, whose job was to "pass orders
downward."' 8 Employees benefit by escaping assignment to repetitive tasks that
them obsolete here in the Information Age. Hierarchies are dinosaurs-lumbering,
unable to adapt to the pace of change, paralyzed by complexity, and doomed to die.
If, on the other hand, your new team-based system is in trouble, the reason is that
you are doing something wrong. Teams-preferably self-managing teams-are the right
and proper building blocks with which to construct modem organizations. The team
concept has no chronic or endemic drawbacks. So you must be flubbing the execution.
Jack Gordon, The Team Troubles That Won't Go Away, 31 TRAINING 25 (1994).
14 See COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note
10, at 42-45; Martin J. Levine, Labor and Management Response to Total Quality
Management, 43 LAB. L.J. 107, 108 (1992); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital
Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78
CoRNELLL. REv. 899, 901 (1993).
15 See Shaun G. Clarke, Note, Rethinking the Adversarial Model in Labor Relations: An
Argumentfor Repeal of Section 8(a)(2), 96 YALE L.J. 2021, 2021 (1987).
16 See Note, Labor-Management Cooperative Programs: Do They Foster or Frustrate
National Labor Policy?, 7 HoFsrRA LAB. L.J. 219, 235 (1989).
17 See JERRY L. MCADAMs & EuzABEr J. HAWK, CArrA=rZING ON HUiMN ASSErs
30 (1992). "Apparently, performance-reward plans are viewed as business strategies, with the
expectation that they will contribute to business results." Id.; see also Kevin C. Naff, Teams
Approach to Credit Management Gaining in Popularity, 49 Bus. CRErr 35-36 (1995).
While it is attractive to attribute companies' successes to teamwork, those successes may
likely result from economic upturns, changes in consumer demand, or any number of other
factors.
18 The Trouble with Teams, ECONOMIST, Jan. 14, 1995, at 61.
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alienate them' 9 and by "feeling that they are shaping their own jobs."'20
B. Teams: One Type of Cooperative Management Plan
Cooperative management programs exist under a myriad of names. Despite
the numerous monikers of these cooperative programs, most can be classified
into one or more of four broad categories: (1) quality control circles, 21 (2)
quality of work-like groups,22 (3) board of director/upper-level management
participation groups,23 and (4) labor-management work teams ("teams"). While
many of the legal problems faced by teams are similarly present when the other
three categories of workplace cooperation are implemented, this Note restricts
its purview to teams.
Workplace team programs 24 attempt to shift responsibilities for controlling
and solving workplace performance problems from managers and supervisors
19 See BARBARA GARSON, ALL THE LIVELONG DAY at x-xi (1975). The author stated:
"Many assembly-line workers deliberately slow their pace from time to time and watch the
pieces pile up. Sometimes this is for revenge against the company that 'treats us like
machines' [and] 'uses us like tools."' Id.; see also Stephen J. Frangos & Steven J. Bennett,
Turnaround at Kodak Park, 58 Bus. Q. 31-41 (1994); Anita Lienert, Forging a New
Partnership, MGMT. REv., Oct. 1994, at 39-43.
20 The Trouble with Teams, supra note 18, at 61.
21 The objective of quality control circles is the improvement of both the production
process and the quality of the product. The circles are comprised of a group of workers from
each department. Circle meetings train workers in quality improvement techniques, with the
intention of aiding employees in identifying, analyzing, and solving work-related problems.
See W rilAM B. GOULD, JAPAN's RESHAPING OF AMEICAN LABOR LAw 95 (1984).
22 Similar to quality control circles, quality of work-like groups are comprised of both
employees and management. However, unlike quality control circles, the purpose of quality
of work-like groups is to "concentrate on methods of ordering work so that through its
execution, workers' needs for fulfillment and personal growth can be met, thereby providing
them a self-generated incentive to perform well." Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Workers
Participation: The Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REv. 499, 506
(1986).
23 In these groups, union representatives sit on the board of directors of their company
and participate as members. See Andrew A. Lipsky, Comment, Participatory Management
Schemes, the Law and Workers' Rights: A Proposed Framework of Analysis, 39 AM. U. L.
REv. 667, 674-75 (1990).
24 The following definition encompasses some of the significant aspects of this concept:
A self-directed work team is a highly trained group of employees, from 6 to 18, on
average, fully responsible for turning out a well-defined segment of finished work. The
segment could be a final product, like a refrigerator or ball bearing; or a service, like a
fully processed insurance claim. It could also be a complete but intermediate product or
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to employees.2 Two primary types of teams are used. One type of team is the
work-unit team, where members of the team create a set of performance
measures related to the companies' objectives; then, in partnership with
management, goals are developed for performance of those measures. 26
Another type of team is the self-managed team, which creates an organizational
structure devoid of the traditional departmentalized structure of many
companies. 27
Regardless of the type of team, several characteristics are inherent in all
teams. 28 Typically, the team is responsible for deciding how much work is to
be completed and by whom, promoting and disciplining workers in the group,
scheduling overtime, and interviewing job applicants. 29 Thus, teams provide
workers with greater responsibility than they would otherwise have as
individual employees, which supposedly motivates workers to achieve higher
levels of performance. 30
It. COMPANY UNIONS: EMPLOYERS' RESPONSE TO UNIONIZATION
A. The Rise of Company Unions
Five decades prior to the advent of cooperative management programs,
unions were a thriving employee organization. In the United States, by 1904,
membership in trade unions exceeded two million people.31 This number
increased to 3.5 million by 1929.32 This dramatic increase in union membership
service, like a finished refrigerator motor, an aircraft fuselage, or the circuit plans for a
television set. Because every member of the team shares equal responsibility for this
finished segment of work, self-directed teams represent the conceptual opposite of the
assembly line, where each worker assumes responsibility for a narrow technical
function.
J. ORsBURN Er AL., SELF-DiREE WoRK TE~m: THE NEw AmmucAN CHALENGE 8
(1990).2 5 See JOSEPH H. BoY=r & HENRY P. CONN, WORKPLACE 2000: THE REVOLUTION
REsHAiNG AmECAN BusiNnss 238 (1991).26 See id.
27 See id. at 239.
28 See supra note 1.
29 See ORSBURN, supra note 24, at 9.
30 See id.
31 See M. DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 1865-1965 at
114-15 (1970).
32 See id. at 175, 203. The primary cause of this increase in union membership was the
increase in production necessary for World War I. See id.
19971
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
provided unions, for the first time, with the power to challenge management's
domination over the labor-management relationship. 33
However, management did not stand idly by as the power shifted. Rather,
management devised two primary methods to counteract the union movement.
First, following the lead of the National Association of Manufacturers, many
companies joined the "open shop" movement. 34 This movement's foundation
was established by disseminating anti-union propaganda, while simultaneously
creating the appearance of attempting to protect workers' rights and freedom of
choice. 35
A second response to the increasing power of unions, and a primary focus
of this Note, was the creation of company unions.36 A company union is an
organization that represents employees, but which lacks true independence, and
also owes a dual obligation to the employer and its employees. 37 By 1935, 60%
of all trade union workers were members of company unions.38 These unions,
referred to as sham unions, 39 were created and dominated by management.40
Thus, company unions differed significantly from other unions in many
important ways: membership was mandatory and restricted to the employees of
only a single employer, management provided the union with its financial
support, outside union negotiators were not included, and the employer had
33 See Edward M. Dicato, Employee Involvement Teams Under the National Labor
Relations Act: Do They Inherently Conflict?, 1990 DEr. C.L. REv. 691, 693.
34 See Kohler, supra note 22, at 519.
35 See id.
36 These entities had many names such as "work councils" or "grievance committees,"
although the common term used was "company unions." See Clarke, supra note 15, at 2023
n.11.
37 One Senator defined a company-dominated union as an organization
initiated and created by the employer, in which the employer participates in its
administration and operations, in which he is represented on all the committees, and
either supervises, initiates, or participates in the decisions or exercises a veto power over
them, in which the employer can veto all proposals for amendments in the organic
charter of the organization, and in which he provides the organization with financial aid
and comfort.
79 CONG. REc. 2332, 2336 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA, LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr, 1935, at 2439 (1959) [hereinafter NLRA HIsTORY].
38 See Douglas Zucker & Pamela Davis-Clarke, Employer-Sponsored Programs Skirt
NLRA Line, N.J. L.J., July 5, 1993, at 10.
39 See Audrey Anne Smith, The Future of Labor-Management Cooperation Following
Electromation and E.I. du Pont, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 225 (1994).
40 See Clarke, supra note 15, at 2023.
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broad discretion in deciding how much value should be given to the input from
the company union.41
B. The Problem with Company Unions
Because management both created and financed company unions,
management had carte blanche in selecting the employees' representatives,
writing the union's bylaws, and determining the union's structure, operating
procedures, and purpose.42 Similarly, management possessed the unilateral
ability to terminate the existence of such company unions at its pleasure. 43 As
Senator Wagner of New York said, "The company union is generally initiated
by the employer; it exists by his sufferance; its decisions are subject to his
unimpeachable veto." 44
Given these characteristics of a company union, company unions were little
more than a puppet of management "masquerading" as a legitimate union.45
Thus, Senator Wagner believed that the company-dominated union was the
greatest obstacle to collective bargaining46 and genuine freedom of self-
organization. 47 Many believed, as Senator Wagner did, that company unions
were "the substitute for and the shield against the regular trade union." 48
41 See id.
42 See H.R. REP. No. 248, at 35 (1995).
43 See id.
44 78 CONG. REC. 4229, 4230 (1934).
45 According to Senator Wagner, a company union was "a masquerade type of union
which is really the creature of the employer rather than the representative of the employee."
79 CoNG. REc. 6183, 6184 (1935), reprinted in NLRA HisTORY, supra note 37, at 2283. For
a discussion on the "masquerade theory," see Bureau of Labor-Management Relations and
Cooperative Programs, U.S. Dep't of Labor, U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor
Management Cooperation, 33 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-1, at 33-57 (Feb. 20, 1987).
46 See 78 CONG. REc. 3443, 3443 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRA, LEGisLA=VE HIsrORY
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR REiAiIONS Acr, 1935, at 15-16 (1959) [hereinafter LEG. Hisr.]
(comments by Sen. Wagner).
47 See Labor Disputes Act: Hearings Before the House Committee on Labor on H.R.
6288, 74th Cong., 14 (1935), reprinted in NLRA HISTORY, supra note 37, at 2488 (testimony
of Sen. Wagner).
48 See CLYDE W. SUMMERS & HARRY H. WELLINGToN, CASES ON LABOR LAw 585 (2d
ed. 1982), quoted in William E. Fulmer & John J. Coleman, Jr., Do Quality-of-Work-Life
Programs Violate Section 8(a) (2)?, 35 LAB. L.J. 675, 676 (1984).
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II. THE NLRA: A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO COMPANY UNIONS
A. An Attempt to Eliminate Company Unions
As a method of forcing management to release this "shield against the
regular trade union," 49 Senator Wagner of New York introduced S. 2926,50
entitled the "Labor Disputes Act," 51 which later became the NLRA.52 The
NLRA was designed to provide employees a "voice" through an independently
4 9 Id.
50 S. 2926, 73d Cong. (1934).
5 1 Id. at§ 1.
52 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988). The 1935 NLRA was enacted by Congress to promote
a peaceful relationship between unions and management, though some commentators have
described this relationship as being formed by a shotgun wedding. See CILARLEs 0. GREGORY
& HAROLD A. KATZ, LABOR AND THE LAw 225 (3d ed. 1979). The NLRA protected the
rights of employees to organize and bargain collectively through their independently selected
representatives; employers, under the Act, were required to recognize and bargain with the
employees' representatives. Before passage of the NLRA, employee attempts to unionize
were met with great resistance by employers; similarly, courts deemed concerted activities
(strikes, picketing, boycotts, etc.) of workers as a conspiracy. See FosTER R. DuLLEs
& MELVYN DUBOFSKY, LABOR iN AMmIcA 242 (4th ed. 1984).
The congressional policy underlying the enactment of the NLRA was discussed in 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1940) which states:
The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by
employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other
forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of
burdening or obstructing commerce.
... The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess
full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized... substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to
aggravate recurrent business depression.
... Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or
interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or
other working conditions, and restoring equality of bargaining power between employers
and employees.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1940).
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selected outside representative, who would serve as a bargaining representative
in discussions with management. 53 Senator Wagner believed that a freely
selected outside representative was fundamental if workers were to effectively
exercise their voice in economic affairs. He believed this autonomous selection
of a bargaining representative was fundamental for several reasons. First, due
to the worker's asymmetrical knowledge of the labor market and general
business conditions (e.g., wages, hours), any attempt to secure legitimately
beneficial opportunities through bargaining with the better-informed
management would be futile.54 Second, bargaining in a subservient role, as
workers' representatives were forced to do as members of company unions,
prevents the representative from freely bargaining without fear of reprisals. 55
As Senator Wagner noted, "[O]nly representatives who are not subservient to
the employer with whom they deal can act freely in the interest of employees.
Simple common sense tells us that a man does not possess this freedom when
he bargains with those who control his source of livelihood." 56 Thus, Senator
Wagner concluded that "the very first step toward genuine collective bargaining
is the abolition of the employer-dominated union as an agency for dealing with
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rules, or hours of employment." 57
B. Section 2(5) and Its Judicial Interpretation
The term "labor organization" is defined broadly in section 2(5) of the
NLRA as: "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee
representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work." 58 Thus, an employee group may be
considered a "labor organization" in three ways: by its form or structure, by
the subject matter it covers, and by the function it serves. 59
The seminal case interpreting the definition of a labor organization is NLRB
v. Cabot Carbon Co.60 In that case, the Supreme Court held, based on its
53 See S. 2926, 73d Cong. §§ 4, 5, 207 (1934), reprinted in LEG. HIsr., supra note 46,
at 3-4, 11.
54 See 78 CONG. REc. 3443 (1934), reprinted in LEG. Hisr., supra note 46, at 15-16.
55 See id.
56 Id. at 16.
57 Id.
58 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1984).
59 See John Schmidman & Kimberlee Keller, Employee Participation Plans as Section
8(a)(2) Violalions, 35 LAB. L.J. 772, 773 (1984).
60 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
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interpretation of section 2(5), that the committees established by the employer
were in fact "labor organizations," as defined by section 2(5).61 In Cabot
Carbon Co., committees were established at all of the employer's plants.62 The
bylaws, drafted in collaboration with employee representatives, suggested that
the purpose of the committees was to establish a mechanism whereby
suggestions from employees and problems between labor and management
could be discussed.63 However, labor and management's discussions exceeded
the anticipatory topics and instead covered almost all topics that concerned the
employer-employee relationship.64 Thus, because the employees were charged
no dues and the employer paid all of the committees' expenses, 65 the NLRB
found that not only were the committees "labor organizations," but also that the
committees were "dominated, interfered with, and supported" by the company
in violation of section 8(a)(2). 66
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set aside
the NLRB's order claiming that the phrase "dealing with" in section 2(5) is
synonymous with "bargaining with." 67 Consequently, the court held, because
there was no "bargaining" occurring in these committees, the committees were
not "labor organizations." 68
The Supreme Court reversed after deciding that the plain language of the
statute and the legislative history indicated that the term "dealing with" should
not be granted such a narrow interpretation. 69 Instead, the Supreme Court
believed that "labor organizations" should be defined broadly to include
employee committees where discussions of the subjects mentioned in section
2(5) occur.70 Thus, the Supreme Court held that because the topics discussed in
61 See id. at 214-15, 218.
62 See id. at 205.
63 See id. Such problems of mutual interest were: "safety; increased efficiency and
production; conservation of supplies, materials, and equipment; encouragement of ingenuity
and initiative; and grievances at nonunion plants or departments." Id. at 205 n.2.
64 See id. at 207-08. Examples included "seniority, job classifications, job bidding,
makeup time, overtime records, time cards, a merit system, wage correction, working
schedules, holidays, vacations, sick leave, and improvement of working facilities and
conditions." Id. at 207.
65 See id. at 209.
66 See id. at 209-10.
67 See id. at 210.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 210-11. For the Court's discussion of the legislative history behind
Congress' adoption of the term "dealing" rather than "bargaining collectively," see id. at
210-12.
70 See id. at 211.
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the committees were directly related to the subjects mentioned in section 2(5),
the committees were in fact labor organizations. 71
C. Section 8(a) (2) and Its Judicial Interpretation
As mentioned above, two elements must be present for section 8(a)(2) to be
violated. First, under section 2(5) there must be an entity deemed a "labor
organization." Second, under section 8(a)(2) the labor organization must be
dominated by, interfered with, or financed by the employer.72 By prohibiting
the employer from interfering with, supporting, or dominating employee labor
organizations, this section ensures that the entities participating in collective
bargaining on behalf of employees will be autonomous.73 Thus, as evidenced
by the enactment of this provision, Congress recognized that legitimate
collective bargaining could only occur if the employer was prohibited from
sitting on both sides of the bargaining table.74 As Senator Wagner stated,
"Collective bargaining becomes a mockery when the spokesman of the
employee is the marionette of the employer." 75
After an entity has been deemed a section 2(5) "labor organization,"
section 8(a)(2) is violated only if the employer has unlawfully dominated,
assisted, or financially supported the labor organization. 76 Judicial inquiry into
whether a section 8(a)(2) violation has occurred usually centers around several
factors. Evidence of a violation of section 8(a)(2) includes: the creation of a
labor organization, 77 aiding its formation, 78 providing financial assistance, 79
71 See id. at 213-14. For the Court's discussion of the legislative history behind the
inclusion of employee committees within the definition of "labor organization," see id. at
214-18.
72 See supra note 7.
73 See 78 CONG. REc. 3678-79 (1934), reprinted in LEG. HIs., supra note 46, at 18-
19.
74 See Labor Disputes Act: Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the Committee on Labor, 74th
Cong., 15 (1935), reprinted in NLRA HisrORY, supra note 37, at 2489 (Senator Wagner
argues that "[c]ollective bargaining becomes a sham when the employer sits on both sides of
the table or pulls the strings behind the spokesman of those with whom he is dealing.").
75 79 CONG. REc. 7565, 7570 (1935), reprinted in NLRA HISTORY, supra note 37, at
2334.
76 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982).
77 See, e.g., NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 270 (1938)
(holding that creation of a company union violated § 8(a)(2)).
78 See, e.g., Home, 61 N.L.R.B. 742, 752 (1945) (holding that the drafting of a charter
and bylaws that started a union constituted an unfair labor practice).
79 See, e.g., Camvac Int'l, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 816, 847 (1988) (stating the fact that
employees were paid for attendance at meetings, and the fact that the personnel director
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allowing the use of company facilities, 80 and aiding a particular union.8'
However, standing alone, the aforementioned acts by an employer are
considered "friendly cooperation"; consequently, these isolated employer acts
do not violate section 8(a)(2). 82 Although if these acts are coupled with other
acts, unlawful assistance, dominance, and support may be found.83
Also, the mere potential for domination, without actual evidence of such,
will not violate section 8(a)(2). 84 However, when a labor organization has no
life of its own, but is instead completely dependent on the employer for its
existence or when management has the power to eliminate or change the
organization at will, domination will be found.85
In 1LR v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 86 the Supreme
Court, in determining whether a company interfered with, dominated, or
unlawfully supported the organization, clearly stated that this determination
rests solely on objective acts. 87 Thus, the motivation behind certain acts by
recorded committee minutes, were evidence of employer domination); Comet Corp., 261
N.L.R.B. 1414, 1447 (1982) (holding that paying employees for meeting on company
property and time, coupled with the company providing clerical assistance, indicates
domination by employer).
80 See, e.g., Dennison Mfg. Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 1012, 1015-16 (1967) (providing office
facilities constitutes unlawful support); Nutone, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1170-71 (1955)
(holding that employer's providing company paper and copying equipment is illegal support);
Shell Oil Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 835, 847, 853 (1937) (holding that employer's providing company
time, company trucks, and company telephones was illegal support).
81 See, e.g., NLRB v. Daylight Grocery Co., 345 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1965) (holding that
an employer's anti-union campaign against one particular union, which resulted in the
formation of a company union, was an unfair labor practice).
82 See Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 629-31 (9th Cir. 1974).
83 See NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 308 U.S. 241, 250-51
(1939); NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1938); NLRB v.
Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82, 85 (7th Cir. 1971).
84 See Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Ghost, 198 N.L.R.B. 891, 892 (1972); see also
NLRB v. Homemaker Shops, Inc., 724 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1984) ("It is not the potential
for employer control, but rather the reality thereof, that is the key element of a true case of
unlawful domination or assistance."); Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165,
167-68, 170 (7th Cir. 1955).
85 See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 995 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th
Cir. 1994). The Board held that "a labor organization that is the creation of management,
whose structure and function are essentially determined by management... and whose
continued existence depends on the fiat of management, is one whose formation or
administration has been dominated under Section 8(a)(2)." Id.
86 308 U.S. 241 (1939).
87 See Newport News, 308 U.S. at 251. The unanimous Court stated that "[in applying
the statutory test of independence it is immaterial that the plan had in fact not engendered, or
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management that may constitute illegal dominance, interference or support is
irrelevant. 88
D. Traditional Analysis Under Attack
The aforementioned traditional analysis that many courts apply when
determining (1) whether a section 2(5) labor organization exists and (2) whether
the labor organization, under section 8(a)(2) has been unlawfully dominated,
interfered with, or financially supported by the company has come under
frequent attacks by some courts and the NLRB. 89 Commentators, along with
indeed had obviated, serious labor disputes in the past, or that any company interference in
the administration of the plan had been incidental... and with good motives." Id.
88 See id.
89 See, e.g., Airstream, Inc. v. NLRB, 877 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1989); NLRB v.
Strearnway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 292-93 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that
"not all management efforts to communicate with employees concerning company personnel
policy are forbidden on pain of violating the Act"; "[a]n overly broad construction of the
statute would be as destructive of the objects of the Act as ignoring the provisions entirely";
"[o]ur circuit is willing to reject a rigid interpretation of the statute and instead consider
whether the employer's behavior fosters employee free expression and choice"); NLRB v.
Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208, 1214 (lst Cir. 1979) (stating that new changes in labor-
management relations indicate a need for "cooperative employer-employee arrangements as
alternatives to the traditional adversary model"); Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d
625, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1974) (stating that "[c]entral to the National Labor Relations Act is the
facilitation of employee free choice and employee self-organization"; "[section] 8(a)(2) is, in
part, a means to that end, for it seeks to permit employees to freely assert their demands for
improvements in working conditions"; "almost any form of employer cooperation.., could
be deemed 'support' or 'interference"'; "such a myopic view of § 8(a)(2) would undermine
its very purpose and the purpose of the Act as a whole-fostering free choice-because it
might prevent the establishment of a system the employees desired"; "the literal prohibition of
[section] 8(a)(2) must be tempered by recognition of the objectives of the NLRA"); Modem
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 289
F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1961). In his dissenting opinion in Walton Mfg. Co., Judge Wisdom
stated:
To my mind an inflexible attitude of hostility toward employee committees defeats
the Act. It erects an iron curtain between employer and employees, penetrable only by
the bargaining agent of a certified union, if there is one, preventing the development of a
decent, honest, constructive relationship between management and labor .... There is
nothing in Cabot Carbon, or in the Labor-Management Act, or in any other law that
makes it wrong for an employer "to work together" with employees for the welfare of
all.
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these courts, see this traditional and purportedly restrictive analysis as an
impediment to cooperative ventures between labor and management, such as
teams. 90 Thus, these courts have responded by narrowing the scope of sections
2(5) and 8(a)(2) and limiting the application of Newport News and Cabot
Carbon Co.
Some decisions have held that challenged committees are not section 2(5)
"labor organizations" because the committees did not "deal" with
management. 91 The NLRB has held that employees who do not stand in an
"agency relationship to a larger body" can "deal" on behalf of only their own
interests.92 Thus, following this analysis, employees, who are members of
plantwide teams, engage in only individual dealing with the company. 93
Similarly, according to this line of reasoning, when the entire workforce is part
of a committee, nobody is representing anyone. 94
Also in an attempt to narrow the scope of section 2(5), the NLRB has held
that activities of certain committees do not rise to the level of "dealing" with
management. 95 For example, management-appointed grievance committees in a
Walton Mfg. Co., 289 F.2d at 182; see also Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d
165 (7th Cir. 1955) (applying an actual, rather than potential, domination test).90 See, e.g., Peter F. Drucker, Are Unions Becoming Irrelevant?, WALL ST. J., Sept.
22, 1982, at 30.
91 See, e.g., Sparks Nugget, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 275, 276 (1977), enf'd in part sub
nom. NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that "the
Employees' Council performs a purely adjudicatory function and does not interact with
management for any purpose or in any manner other than to render a final decision on the
grievance"; "[tlherefore, it cannot be said that the Employees' Council herein 'deals with'
management"); see also Mercy-Memorial Hosp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977).
92 See General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1234 (1977). The Board stated that
when there is no agency relationship, "all that can come into being is a staff meeting or the
factory equivalent thereof.... No team [in this case] had a team spokesman." Id. at 1234-
35.
However, while the Board may have correctly decided this case, it overlooked the many
examples where individual workers have been found to be acting on behalf of others when the
others were not even involved in the situation. See NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465
U.S. 822 (1984). In this case, the Court stated that "the term 'concerted activit[y]' is not
defined in the Act, but it clearly enough embraces the activities of employees who have joined
together in order to achieve common goals." Id. at 830.
93 See General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977).
94 See id.
95 See, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 (1993) (finding
that "brainstorming" groups involving all plant employees did not "deal with" management
because no proposals were made or adopted); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230, 244
(1985) (relying on Mercy-Memorial Hospital to find that the communications committee
created by management was not a statutory labor organization because it was "used as a
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nonunion setting have been held by the NLRB as not dealing with
management. 96 Rather, the NLRB has held that the grievance committee serves
a statutorily protected "purely adjudicatory function. "97
Furthermore, to narrow the scope of section 8(a)(2), several courts of
appeals have adopted a test of actual, rather than potential, domination, thus
following the line of reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Chicago Rawhide
MaUfacturing Co. V. NLRB. 98 The First, 99 Sixth,1° ° and Ninth10 ' Circuits
have advanced this line of reasoning further by requiring that the employees
subjectively view the company-sponsored organization as impeding their
independence. Also important to these courts is whether the employer has an
anti-union animus, even though the Supreme Court in Newport News,102
expressly held that the existence of anti-union animus is irrelevant when
determining whether an organization has been unlawfully dominated. ' 03
V. ELECrROMATION, INC.104
A. The Facts
Despite a myriad of decisions interpreting sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2), prior to
the 1992 decision in Electromation, Inc., the NLRB had not made a bright line
ruling on which functions of cooperative management programs would violate
management tool that was intended to increase company efficiency" and not as "an employee
representative or advocate"); Mercy-Memorial Hosp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977) (finding
that an employer sponsored grievance committee was not a statutory labor organization
because the committee merely "gave employees a voice" in the process, and the personnel
manager had the final authority over any resolution); Sparks Nugget, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B.
275, 276 (1977) (finding that a employer sponsored and dominated grievance committee does
not "deal with" management but rather "performs purely adjudicatory functions" delegated to
it by management).
96 See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. at 240-44; Mercy-Memorial Hosp., 231
N.L.R.B. at 1108; Sparks Nugget, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. at 275, 276.
97 See Sparks Nugget, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. at 276; see also Mercy-Memorial Hosp., 231
N.L.R.B. at 1108-09.
98 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
99 See NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208 (lst Cir. 1979).
100 See Airstream, Inc. v. NLRB, 877 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1989); NLRB v. Streamway
Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982); Modem Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,
379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967).
101 See Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974).
102 NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 308 U.S. 241 (1939).
103 See id. at 250-51.
104 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992).
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the NLRA. Thus, those companies that were either contemplating or already
using these programs were anxiously awaiting the NLRB's decision in
Electromation, Inc. This case determinatively answered two lingering
questions. First, "when does an employee committee lose its protection as a
communication device and become a labor organization?" 105 Second, "what
employer conduct constitutes domination, assistance, or interference with the
employee committee?"106
In this case, a manufacturing employer reduced employee benefits in 1988
after sustaining financial losses.' 0 7 In response, sixty-eight employees signed a
petition expressing displeasure concerning the reduced benefits. 108 Company
President John Howard attempted to assuage the workers' unhappiness by
establishing five "action committees." 109 The company not only determined the
composition of the committees, it also established the committees' agendas. 110
The company's benefits manager envisioned the committees as a forum where
"employee members on the Committees would 'kind of talk back and forth'
with the other employees in the plant, get their ideas, and ... ensure that
'anyone [who] wanted to know what was going on ... could go to these
people.'")I11
B. The NLRB's Ruling
After an administrative law judge found that the action committees were
labor organizations dominated and assisted by the company, 112 Electromation,
Inc. appealed the decision to the NLRB on the grounds that the committees
were not labor organizations. 113 The NLRB began its decision by looking at the
statutory language of sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2). 114 However, after determining
that the language was ambiguous, the NLRB looked to the legislative history to
ascertain the NLRA's purpose. 115 The NLRB, after examining the legislative
105 Id. at 990-91.
106 Id.
107 See id.108 See id.
109 See id.
110 See id. Each committee included six volunteer employees and two managers.
1111Id. at 991.
112 See id. at 990, 1015-33.
113 See id.
114 See id. at 992-93.
115 "Here, we cannot properly limit our analysis to the statutory language because the
terms are not all self-defining." Id. at 992.
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history, determined that the relevant provisions' purpose was to eliminate the
company-dominated unions. 116
After its analysis of the NLRA's legislative history, the NLRB proceeded to
establish a four-part test117 to determine whether a section 2(5) "labor
organization" exists. According to the NLRB's test, a section 2(5) labor
organization exists if: (1) employees participate, (2) the organization exists, at
least in part, for the purpose of dealing with employers, (3) these dealings
concern conditions of work or other statutory subjects, and (4) the organization
has as a purpose the representation of employees.' 18 The NLRB stressed that
any group could be a section 2(5) "labor organization" despite a lack of formal
structure, no elected officers, no constitution or bylaws, no regularly scheduled
meetings, and no dues. 119
Following the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Cabot
Carbon Co. 120 and applying its test to the facts of the case, the NLRB held that
the committees were section 2(5) "labor organizations" because: (1) employees
participated in the committees, (2) the activities of the committee constituted
"dealing with" the employer, (3) the committees discussed conditions of
employment, such as attendance and employee compensation, and (4) the
employee committee members acted as a representative of all employees
there. 121
Also, the NLRB held that the employer's creation of "action committees"
designed to allow both management and labor to discuss absenteeism, no-
smoking policies, and pay progression plans violated section 8(a)(2). 122 The
NLRB ruled that the employer dominated the committees in violation of section
8(a)(2) by supplying the idea for the committees and by determining their
structure and objectives. 123 Additionally, the NLRB ruled that the employer
unlawfully provided financial support to the committees by allowing the
employees to attend committee meetings while being paid.124
In addition, the NLRB rejected the idea that anti-union animus should be
required to find that an action committee, and similar entities, have been
116 "The legislative history reveals that the provisions outlawing company dominated
labor organizations were a critical part of the Wagner Act's purpose of eliminating industrial
strife... ." Id.
117 See id. at 996.
118 See id.
119 See id.
120 Cabot Carbon Co. v. NLRB, 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
121 See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 996-98.
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 See id.
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unlawfully dominated in violation of section 8(a)(2). 125 Finally, the NLRB
stressed that "a labor organization that is the creation of management, whose
structure and function are essentially determined by management... and
whose continued existence depends on the fiat of management, is one whose
formation or administration has been dominated under section 8(a)(2)."1 26
C. The Seventh Circuit's Decision
Despite vehement argument from American business leaders that the
decision would render most cooperative management programs illegal, the
Seventh Circuit adhered to the legislative intent behind the NLRA and affirmed
the NLRB's decision. 127 The court stated that the NLRB in,
exercising its discretion to construe the Act in light of the legislative history,
applicable Supreme Court precedent, and the underlying policies of the
Act.... found that the company's actions here fell within the statutory
proscriptions and did not implicate changing industrial realities that might be
relevant to construction of the statute in other circumstances.
... Instead, it simply observed that it does not have latitude to change a
particular construction of the statute based on changing industrial realities
where congressional intent to the contrary is absolutely clear, or where the
Supreme Court has decreed that a particular reading of the statute is required,
or both. Nor was it necessary to do so in this case. 12 8
D. Electromation, Inc. 's Perceived Effects: Myth or Reality?
Despite claims from companies with cooperative management programs in
place that the Electromation, Inc. decision would render such programs illegal
under the NLRA, this result is dubious. As Professor Morris wrote,
Electromation, Inc. is a case "more significant for its hype than its type." 129 As
the Seventh Circuit made clear, its ruling "does not foreclose the lawful use of
legitimate employee participation organizations, especially those which are
independent, which do not function in a representational capacity, and which
focus solely on increasing company productivity efficiency, and quality
control." 130 Thus, the Electromation, Inc. ruling is a narrow bne, applying only
125 See id.
126 Id. at 995.
127 See Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
128 Id. at 1157.
129 Charles J. Morris, Deja Vu and 8(a)(2)-What's Really Being Odlled by
Electromation, 4 CoRNEaL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 25, 25 (1994).
130 Electromation, Inc., 35 F.3d at 1153.
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to employer-created and controlled employee committees that discuss wages
and working conditions. As Edward Miller, former Chairman of the NLRB,
stated, the assertion that Electromation, Inc. was the death knell for employee
involvement is a "myth"; it "is indeed possible to have effective
programs ... without the necessity of any changes in current law." 131
V. T.E.A.M.: A CRITIQUE
Despite this myth of Electromation, Inc.'s chilling effect on cooperative
relations between management and labor, in 1995 Representative Steve
Gunderson (R-WI) submitted to the House H.R. 743, the Teamwork for
Employees and Managers Act. 132 Gunderson's proposal explicitly recognized
131 Myths and Reality About U.S. Labor Relations: Before the Commission on the Future
of Worker-Management Relations, 201 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-7, at 1 (Oct. 20, 1993).132 H.R. 743, 104th Cong. (1995). The full text of the Bill is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled,
SEC. 1. SHORTTITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of
1993."
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PuRPOSES.
(a) Findings-Congress finds that-
(1) the escalating demands of global competition have compelled an increasing
number of employers in the United States to make dramatic changes in workplace and
employer-employee relationships;
(2) such changes involve an enhanced role for the employee in workplace
decisionmaking, often referred to as "employee involvement," which has taken many
forms, including self-managed work teams, quality-of-worklife, quality circles, and joint
labor-management committees;
(3) employee involvement structures, which operate successfully in both unionized
and nonunionized settings, have been established by over 80 percent of the largest
employers in the United States and exist in an estimated 30,000 workplaces;
(4) in addition to enhancing the productivity and competitiveness of businesses in
the United States, employee involvement programs have had a positive impact on the
lives of such employees, better enabling them to reach their potential in the workforce;
(5) recognizing that foreign competitiors have successfully utilized employee
involvement techniques, Congress has consistently joined business, labor and academic
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the alleged need for labor-management cooperation. 133 This Act would amend,
rather than revise, section 8(a)(2) to allow for companies to create management
leaders in encouraging and recognizing successful employee involvement programs in
the workplace through such incentives as the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award;
(6) employers who have instituted legitimate employee involvement programs have
not done so to interfere with the collective bargaining rights guaranteed by the labor
laws, as was the case in the 1930's when employers established deceptive sham
"company unions" to avoid unionization; and
(7) employee involvement is currently threatened by interpretations of the
prohibition against employer-dominated "company unions."
(b) Purposes-The purpose of this Act is to-
(1) protect legitimate employee involvement programs against governmental
interference;
(2) preserve existing protections against deceptive, coercive employer practices;
and
(3) permit legitimate employee involvement structures, where workers may discuss
issues involving terms and conditions of employment, to continue to evolve and
proliferate.
SEC. 3. ADMENDmENTTO SECTION 8(a)(2) OFTHE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr.
Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)) is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following: "Provided fwuther, That it shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under this paragraph for an
employer to establish, assist, maintain, or participate in any organization or entity of any
kind, in which employees participate to discuss matters of mutual interest, (including
issues of quality, productivity, and efficiency), and which does not have, claim, or seek
authority to negotiate or enter into collective bargaining agreements under this Act with
the employer or to amend existing collective bargaining agreements between the
employer and any labor organization, except that in a case in which a labor organization
is the representative of such employees as provided in section 9(a), this proviso shall not
apply."
SEC. 4. CONSTRUCIMON CLAUSE LIMITING EFFEcr OF Acr.
Nothing in this Amendment made by section 3 shall be construed as affecting
employee rights and responsibilities under the National Labor Relations Act other than
those contained in section 8(a)(2) of such Act.
S. 669, 103d Cong. §§ 1-4 (1993); see also H.R. 1529, 103d Cong. (1993).
133 The stated purpose of T.E.A.M. is to: (1) protect legitimate employee involvement
structures against governmental interference; (2) preserve existing protections against
deceptive, coercive employer practices; and (3) permit legitimate employee involvement
structures where workers may discuss issues involving terms and conditions of employment,
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and labor teams which would discuss such issues as productivity, quality
control, safety, and other terms and conditions of employment. 134 More
fundamentally, H.R. 743 amends section 8(a)(2) by mandating that only
employee committees that act in a representational capacity may be found
invalid because of an employer's unlawful domination or support. 135
A. The NLRA Is Premised on an Adversarial Model
As a result of the incendiary relationship between management and labor
following the Depression, 136 some believe that the NLRA was based on the
assumption that this relationship is inherently adversarial in nature. 137
to continue to evolve and proliferate. See 139 CONG. REc. S4013, S4014 (daily ed. Mar. 30,
1993) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum).
134 See H.R. 743, 104th Cong. (1995).
135 See id.
136 See 78 CONG. REc. 4229, 4230 (1934), reprinted in LEG. HIsr., supra note 46, at
22; see also IRVING BERNS=EI, TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AME~icAN WORKER
172-73, 217 (1969) (stating that in July of 1933 alone, the number of worker-days lost as a
result of strikes was two times greater than the number during the previous six months, and
that in 1934, there were 1,856 work stoppages involving 1,470,000 workers); Peter G. Nash,
The NLRA at Age Fifty, 36 LAB. L.J. 600, 601 (1985) (describing the industrial strife
occurring following the Depression that was severely obstructing the nation's flow of
commerce).
137 See, e.g., WILIAM B. GouLD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF
EMPLOYMENT RELATIoNsI-Is AND THE LAw 121 (1993); Janice R. Bellace, The Role of Law
in Supporting Cooperative Employee Representational Systems, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 441,
441, 458-59 (1994); David H. Brody, The Future of Labor-Management Cooperative Efforts
Under Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 41 VAND. L. REv. 545, 547
(1988) (stating that "[c]ontrary to the contentions of later cases, the Act's drafters did not
intend to promote cooperation between labor and management"); Clarke, supra note 15, at
2022 ("Under section 8(a)(2).... an outside labor organization [is] committed by law to the
adversarial model. . . ."); William B. Gould IV, Reflections on Workers' Participation,
Influence and Powersharing: The Future of Industrial Relations, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 381,
383 (1989); W. Gary Vause, Symposium Overview-1992 Critical Issues in Labor and
Employment Law, 22 S' ON L. REv. 1, 6-10 (1992); Martin T. Moe, Note, Participatory
Workplace Decisionmaldng and the NLRA: Section 8(a)(2), Electromation, and the Specter of
the Company Union, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1127, 1142 (1993); Note, Labor-Management
Cooperation After Electromation. Implications for Workplace Diversity, 107 HARv. L. REv.
678, 681 (1994) ("Mhe statute does, in fact, create an exclusively adversarial model.... ");
Harold J. Datz, Employee Participation Programs and the National Labor Relations Act-A
Guide for the Perplexed, 30 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-1 (Feb. 17, 1993).
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However, this assumption has been challenged by commentators 138 and many
lower courts, 139 which have attempted to partially uncover the NLRA's
"blanket prohibition against any employer-sponsored employee representation
plan." 140
The determination of whether the NLRA was premised on the assumption
of an inherently adversarial relationship is crucial in interpreting the NLRA to
determine the legality of cooperative management programs, such as teams. If
the NLRA were premised on such an assumption, it should be interpreted to
invalidate the legality of modem cooperative management programs, and
legislation (e.g., T.E.A.M.) which would allow for such programs by
amending or revising the NLRA, should be viewed with skepticism. However,
as some courts have stated, if the NLRA were premised not on the assumption
of an adversarial relationship between labor and management, but rather to
promote cooperation between management and workers, 141 then the NLRA
should be interpreted to allow for cooperative management programs, and
legislation amending or revising the NLRA to permit such programs should be
at least considered.
138 See Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol,
and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1381, 1492 (The adversarial interpretation
evolved because of "[w]artime labor policy, the Taft-Hartley Amendments, and post-War
administrative and judicial interpretations."); Kohler, supra note 22, at 549 ("What Congress
originally intended by the provisions of Section 8(a)(2) largely either has been forgotten or
become ambiguous through the holdings of influential appellate courts."); Note, supra note
137, at 681 ("Whereas employee-employer interests were once seen as mutually exclusive,
cultural changes have made employer and employee interests compatible at least some of the
time.").
139 See, e.g., NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 293 (6th
Cir. 1982) (referring to the Modem Plastics Corp. holding that "the adversarial model of
labor relations is an anachronism"); NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208, 1214 (1st
Cir. 1979); Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 1974); Federal-
Mogul Corp., Coldwater Distrib. Ctr. Div. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 1968);
Modem Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 1967); Hotpoint Co. v. NLRB,
289 F.2d 683, 688-89 (7th Cir. 1961); Coppus Eng'g Corp. v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564, 573
(1st Cir. 1957); Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1955)
("[C]ooperation between management and labor" is "the principal purpose of the Act.").
140 Kenneth 0. Alexander, Worker Participation and the Law Once Again: Overview
and Evaluation, 39 LAB. L.J. 696, 697 (1988).
141 See, e.g., Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d at 1214; Hertzka & Knowles, 503 F.2d at
631; Federal-Mogul Corp., Coldwater Distib. Or. Div., 394 F.2d at 918; Modem Plastics
Corp., 379 F.2d at 204; Hotpoint Co., 289 F.2d at 688-89; Coppus Engg Corp., 240 F.2d at
573.
[Vol. 58:241
LABOR-MANAGEMENT TEAMS
The most convincing argument, however, is that Senator Wagner's intent,
as reflected in the NLRA, was to preserve a strictly adversarial relationship
between management and labor. Four bases support this argument. First, the
plain language of the statute unqualifiedly prohibits support to any labor
organization regardless of employer motive and organizational wishes.142
Second, the NLRA was written and judicially interpreted to make a clear
distinction between "employees," who receive protection from the NLRA, and
representatives of management, such as "supervisors" and "managers," who do
not.143 "Supervisors" and "managers" have been interpreted to include any
worker who uses his discretion or who makes decisions in the interest of the
employer or to implement management's policies. 44 Because "supervisors"
and "managers" perform these functions, they are excluded from the NLRA's
protection. This exclusion assures that management interests and decisions are
outside the employees' role in the dichotomy between labor and management.
Third, the legislative history of the NLRA supports the proposition that the
NLRA was premised on an assumption of an inherently adversarial relationship
between management and labor. The original language of section 2(5) defined
"labor organization" as including "any organization, labor union, association,
corporation or society of all kind." 145 However, Senator Wagner's fear of
scheming employers circumventing this language by establishing employee
committees146 prompted a revision of the Bill to include any "employee
142 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988). This plain language of the statute is even more
convincing once the canon of statutory construction applied in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984), is considered. There the
Court held that courts may not supply their own interpretation of a statute when Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. Id.
143 See NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170,
186-87 (1981); NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-90 (1974).
144 See Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 672.
145 S. 2926, 73d Cong. § 4(5) (1934), reprinted in LEG. HIST., supra note 46, at 2.
146 Professor Kohler alludes to an interesting verbal exchange between Senator Wagner
and a witness that provides insight as to why Senator Wagner feared that employers would
circumvent the language of the original Act by establishing employee committees. When
giving testimony before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Otto Beyer stated, "I
would just like to give you this warning-no matter how many unfair labor practices you spell
out in this act, you are not going to be very successful in catching the employer in bringing
about company unions. There are various devices and ways of doing it." Koher, supra note
22, at 545-46 (citing LEG. HisT., supra note 46, at 258). Wagner, skeptical of Beyer's
warning, responded that employers had not been "very astute about it so far." Id. Beyer
retorted, "They will get more astute." Id.
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representation committee." 147 Thus, had Congress envisioned at least some
limited cooperation between management and labor in the form of employee
committees, Congress would have excluded employee representation
committees outside the scope of the definition of "labor organizations."
Fourth, a final basis of support for the claim that the NLRA was premised
on an adversarial model is provided by Justice Brennan. Writing for the
majority in NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Intl Union,148 he stated that labor and
management "still proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic
viewpoints and concepts of self-interest. The system has not reached the ideal of
the philosophic notion that perfect understanding among people would lead to
perfect agreement among them on values." 149
B. T.E.A.M. Is Gratuitous
Supporters of T.E.A.M. allege that its passage is necessary to insure the
legality of cooperative plans between management and labor. 150 However,
contrary to these claims, section 8(a)(2) does not prohibit a system of
cooperative management.' 5' In fact, in General Foods Corp.,152 the NLRB
held that teams that are "administrative subdivisions" of an employer, reflecting
an attempt by management to implement "the best way to organize the work
force to get the job done,' 53 do not violate section 8(a)(2). Thus, as mentioned
in the NLRB's decision in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., certain unilateral
mechanisms, such as brainstorming groups, information sharing, and
suggestion boxes constitute permissible labor-management cooperation.' 54
The NLRB also made clear that as long as a team does not act as "a
bargaining agent"-or if they do act as a bargaining agent that these actions are
"de minimis and isolated" ' 55-then such teams do not violate section 8(a)(2).156
Thus, in a unionized setting, as long as management acknowledges that the
147 See LEG. HRsT., supra note 46, at 1085, 1086; see also LEG. HIST., supra note 46,
at 1319, 1320 (comparison of § 2926 (73d Cong.) and § 1958 (74th Cong.) Senate Committee
Print).
148 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
1 4 9 Id. at 488-89.
150 See 141 CoNG. REc. H9523, H9525 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Stenholm); id. at H-9526 (statement of Rep. Knollenberg); id. at H9529 (statement of Rep.
Talent).
151 See H.R. REP. No. 248 at 2-13 (1995); supra Part llI.C.
152 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977).
153 Id. at 1234.
154 See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 (1993).155 See General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. at 1235.
156 See id.
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union is the employees' representative, some form of labor-management
cooperation (e.g., teams) can occur.157
The fact that since 1977, there has not been one single case before the
NLRB that questioned the legality of teams also casts doubt on the claim by
supporters of T.E.A.M. that it is necessary to preserve cooperative
management programs.1 58 Similarly, according to a study by Professor James
Rundle, from 1983 to 1993, the NLRB has issued only seventeen orders
requiring an employer to terminate an employer-created employee
organization. 159 Interestingly, in only two of these cases was the organization
not created to either enervate a union organizing drive or to bypass an existing
union. 16° Thus, it appears as if T.E.A.M. is a solution in search of a
problem.161
C. The Problem with Teams: Teams Harm Employees
Regardless of the benefits or defects of T.E.A.M., a more fundamental
question merits an answer: Are labor and management teams, 162 which
T.E.A.M. would allow, harmful to employees? This query must be answered
before passing legislation that allegedly allows for teams because, depending on
the answer, there might be little merit in having teams in the first place.
There are numerous flaws endemic to teams that harm workers. First,
labor-management cooperation, such as teams, is primarily for the economic
benefit of management, thus if the employees' involvement is not implemented
fairly, the benefits for employees of labor-management cooperation may never
come to fruition. For example, it has been suggested that after implementing
157 See Kohler, supra note 22, at 527.
158 See Hearings on Removing Impediments to Employee Partiipation/Electromation
Before the Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations of the House Economic and
Educational Opportunities Committee, 104th Cong., 27 (Feb. 8, 1995) (statement of Howard
Knicely, Chairman of the Labor Policy Association and Executive Vice President of TRW,
Inc.).
159 See James Rundle, The Debate Over the Ban on Employer-Dominated Labor
Organizations: Wat Is the Evidence?, in RESrORiNG TnE PROmSE OF AMEiCAN LABOR
LAw 161 (1994).
160 See id.
161 See Teamwork for Employment and Management Act of 1995 Hearing of the
Committee of Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong., 61 (Feb. 9, 1995) (testimony of
David M. Silberman, Director, AFL-CIO Task Force on Labor Law).
162 See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
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teams, employees may simply be asked to work harder and that the company
may use the resulting increase in efficiency to reduce the workforce. 163
Another pitfall of teams is that cooperation between labor and management
may be no more than a facade to convince employees that their concerns and
desires are actually being addressed by management. Labor unions are
generally suspicious of businesses' motives for implementing teams. 164 Also,
despite claims of teams "empowering" workers, teams often replace top-down
managerial control with peer pressure, a force that is sometimes no less
coercive. 165
Perhaps the most deleterious ramification of teams is that if employees are
involved in "managerial" decisions, as they often are in teams, they may lose
their protection under the NLRA. The dichotomy between labor and
management is central to the NLRA's structure of collective bargaining. 166 As
163 See BARRY BLUESTONE & IRVING BLUESrONE, NEGOiTATING THE FuTuRE. 167
(1992).
164 Their suspicions surface in the following quote:
The quality of working life and the quality of business ethics cannot be separated. In the
private sector, the profit priority motivates most employer behavior, which can be
characterized as mean and rationalistic. Management-initiated "quality of life" programs
are usually disguised attempts to achieve speedup.... [U]nions often regard employee
involvement programs as a means of undermining union members' commitment to their
unions.
Robert S. Adler & William B. Bigoness, Contemporary Ethical Issues in Labor-Management
Relations, 11 J. Bus. Emics 351, 357 (1992) (quoting AFSCME President Jerry Wur); see
also CoMMsON ON THE FuTuRE oF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATiONS, supra note 10, at
31. The Commission's report contained the following comments:
We have deep skepticism toward the notion that workers and management have much in
common in dealing with workplace problems. They compete with each other to divide
the economic pie, much as companies compete for market share. The idea that they
share interests has historically been used to defeat or preempt unions ....
Id. (citing Labor Notes, The Independence of Labor (Oct. 1, 1993) (a paper submitted to the
Commission 1993)).
165 See id. at 30-32.
166 See Note, Collective Bargaining as an Industrial Sstem: An Argument Against
Judicial Revision of Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 96 HAgv. L. REv.
1662, 1677 (1983). The NLRA defines employee, in pertinent part, to include "any
employee ... but shall not include any individual... employed as a supervisor.... " 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982). The Act defines a "supervisor" as:
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one commentator noted, "The Act's definition of employee, employer, and
supervisor all assume a strict dichotomy between employees, who are entitled
to the Act's protections, and managers, who are not." 167 Even though the
NLRA explicitly excludes supervisors from its protections, the managerial
exclusion was judicially created in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 168 where the
Supreme Court defined "managerial" employees as "executives who formulate
and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative
decisions of their employer .... "169 These discretionary functions are viewed
as outside labor's role in the labor-management dichotomy.' 70 Thus, the Court
held that "managerial employees," who exercise discretionary functions in
furtherance of company objectives, "are not covered by the Act." 171
The Supreme Court expanded the managerial exclusion in NLRB v. Yeshiva
University172 by holding that university professors were not "employees" under
the NLRA because of the "managerial" aspects of their jobs.173 The Court held
that because professors voted on matters such as class size, academic standards,
and curriculum, they "exercise authority which in any other context
unquestionably would be managerial." 174 The Court noted that any other
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent
judgment.
Id. § 152(11).
167 Note, supra note 166, at 1677.
168 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
169 Id. at 286 (quoting Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning, 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4
(1947)).170 See Clarke, supra note 15, at 2042.
171 BellAerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 289.
172 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
173 See id. at 672.
174 Id. at 686. The Court stated:
The controlling consideration in this case is that the faculty of Yeshiva University
exercise authority which in any other context unquestionably would be managerial. Their
authority in academic matters is absolute. They decide what courses will be offered,
when they will be scheduled, and to whom they will be taught. They debate and
determine teaching methods, grading policies, and matriculation standards. They
effectively decide which students will be admitted, retained, and graduated. On occasion
their views have determined the size of the student body, the tuition to be charged, and
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decision "would undermine the goal [the NLRA] purports to serve: To ensure
that employees who exercise discretionary authority on behalf of the employer
will not divide their loyalty between employer and union."' 75
These decisions' impact on employee team members may be significant.
Teams are specifically designed to give employees more managerial and
supervisory tasks and to participate in managerial decisionmaking. 176 The
Dunlop Commission stated that some cooperative programs, such as teams,
"blur the traditional distinction between supervisors or managers and workers,
raising questions about the coverage of employees under the NLRA."1 77 If
teams convert employees, who receive protection under the NLRA, into
managers and supervisors, who are not protected under the NLRA, then this
cost of teams alone renders them suspect. Employees, after all, should not be
forced to choose between cooperation with management and their statutorily
granted section 7 rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
In passing the NLRA, the government attempted to create a system of
labor-management relations where employees were represented by their
independently selected representatives, rather than by company dominated
unions. However, with the advent of cooperative management programs, such
as teams, this system is in jeopardy; T.E.A.M. would only threaten this system
more. 178 Although the United States economy is certainly functioning now in a
the location of a school. When one considers the function of a university, it is difficult to
imagine decisions more managerial than these. To the extent the industrial analogy
applies, the faculty determines within each school the product to be produced, the terms
upon which it will be offered, and the customers who will be served.
Id.
175 Id. at 687-88.
176 See supra Part I.B.
177 COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note
10, at7.
178 As eighteen Representatives noted:
Stripped of all the rhetoric, H.R. 743 stands for the proposition that employers should be
able to choose and control who shall speak for employees on matters in which the
interests of employers and employees are inherently divergent and sometimes at odds.
... To use an analogy from American history, it is akin to saying that allowing the
British Parliament to choose which Americans would represent the interests of American
colonists (and on what issues they would be able to speak) would have provided adequate
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global economy, a strategy for facing this challenge should not infringe on the
rights of workers granted to them in the NLRA.
H.R. REP. No. 248, at 40 (1995).
and sufficient representation for Americans. That such a gross contradiction of core
concepts of fairness is likely to produce cooperation, or anything other than animosity, is
no more likely today than it was in 1776.
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